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Seeing Justice Done: Courtroom Filming and the Deceptions of Transparency 
 
Abstract 
 
There has been a global shift towards courtroom broadcasting in a bid to extend the 
public gallery into a virtual realm. Such initiatives tend to be based on the idea that 
transmitting the courtroom boosts transparency, and with it public trust in criminal 
justice. This is an untested ambition. Moreover, the idea that filming opens a win-
dow onto the courtroom comes up against the reality that any transmission entails 
translation, involving choices and compromises. Based on an in-depth study of 
courtroom filming and audience response, this article identifies two globally domi-
nant stylistic modes and analyses their meaning and reception. We found that dif-
ferent stylistic modes prompt different types of audience engagement and allow for 
different levels of comprehension. The analysis therefore provides an insight into 
how courtroom footage is consumed by the viewing public. It also contributes to our 
understanding of the norms and values of institutional transparency. 
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Seeing Justice Done: Courtroom Filming and the Deceptions of Transparency 
 
Introduction 
 
 There has been a worldwide shift during the last 20 years towards the intro-
duction of film cameras to courtrooms, radically transforming the manner in which 
the public is able to ‘see justice being done’, to paraphrase the famous legal apho-
rism of Lord Justice Hewart. In the second decade of the twenty-first century there 
has been an evident acceleration in this shift, with the global transmission of high-
profile criminal hearings such as those involving Anders Breivik (in 2012) and Oscar 
Pistorius (in 2014). Courtroom transmission is fast becoming a quintessential fea-
ture of modern criminal justice, an innovation that is especially prized by those 
courts that style themselves as forward-looking. Take, by way of example, the UK 
Supreme Court (UKSC), operating since 2009 as the final court of appeal in the UK 
for all civil cases and for criminal cases from England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. 
The Court was designed with built-in cameras and releases video recordings of 
summary judgements via the Court’s website and dedicated YouTube channel 
(UKSC, 2013). The International Criminal Court (ICC) has also, since its inception, 
allowed film cameras to follow its work: court proceedings are transmitted via a 
dedicated online platform and there have been four documentaries showcasing and 
celebrating the ICC’s work (Werner, 2016).  
 
The UKSC and ICC have something else in common: they are relatively new 
Courts, and their founding, in both cases, was a matter of considerable critical de-
bate (see Cornes, 2013 and O’Sullivan, 2018 respectively). This should alert us to 
the fact that courtroom transmission is more than simply a technical innovation. It is 
a means of legitimising the authority of an institution, asserting the significance of 
public interest in its work, and signalling a commitment to ‘transparency’, a much-
used word in policy and public debate on courtroom filming (Garcia-Blanco and 
Bennett, 2018).  
 
It is tempting to see transparency as the twenty-first century equivalent of ‘open jus-
tice’, and courtroom transmission as the newest solution to a historic problem con-
cerning how to give the public access to court processes and outcomes. The eight-
eenth century English jurist and philosopher Jeremy Bentham famously saw ‘public-
ity’ as the ‘very soul of justice’, and believed that open courts serve as schools and 
theatres of justice (Bentham in Burton, 1843: 115-6). As Johnston (2018) points 
out, twenty-first century court communication initiatives are framed in these same 
terms. Across jurisdictions, the rationale for courtroom filming initiatives has presup-
posed that a virtual extension of the public gallery will facilitate better understanding 
of and trust in the criminal justice system (see, for example, Ministry of Justice, 
2012: 7). In this sense, ‘transparency’ and ‘open justice’ are both premised upon 
the idea that there is a close and straightforward connection between seeing, un-
derstanding, and trusting.  
 
Despite these important similarities in stated purpose and ethos, we want to argue 
for the importance of seeing ‘transparency’ as distinct from earlier attempts at 
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‘openness’. We flesh-out this argument below, but by way of introduction want to 
note one very important respect in which courtroom transmission — and ‘transpar-
ency’ more broadly — differs from the sort of public access that Bentham had in 
mind. It is an inevitably mediated form of justice that is ‘seen to be done’ via court-
room transmissions. The point of departure for this article is that any attempt to 
transmit the courtroom involves choices around what to show and how to show it. 
Thus, this article’s first aim is to outline the different choices involved in filming the 
courtroom and, from there, to identify key stylistic tendencies in as-live courtroom 
footage. This means accepting that even courtroom footage that appears entirely 
devoid of style — what we call the ‘transcription mode’ of filming in the analysis be-
low — reflects particular assumptions concerning what is worth showing and see-
ing. Unpacking this style and set of assumptions means unpacking the values and 
norms of ‘transparency’. It also means recognising that different types of courtroom 
footage are likely to elicit different audience responses. Thus, this article’s second 
aim is to demonstrate that different stylistic modes of courtroom filming influence 
how the viewing public make sense of court processes and outcomes. 
 
This line of inquiry is of relevance beyond courtroom filming and transmission. Over 
the past two decades there has been a shift towards live-link video participation in 
court proceedings. In England and Wales, as well as Australia and New Zealand, 
the expectation is that the court of the future will be (in the first instance and as 
much as possible) virtual (Rowden, 2018; Ministry of Justice et al, 2016). Research-
ers have started to detail the likely impact of this technological turn on defendants 
(McKay, 2018a; 2018b), victims and survivors (Smith, 2018), and the justice system 
more broadly (Mulcahy, 2008; 2011; Rowden, 2018). This body of research exam-
ines how the increased reliance on video-conferencing is changing the nature and 
meaning of justice — by, for example, limiting the possibility for meaningful contact 
between defendant-prisoners and their lawyers (McKay, 2018b) and sanitising court 
proceedings by reducing the reliance on physical co-presence (Mulcahy, 2008). 
This article seeks to contribute to this body of research by urging a recognition that 
there are choices to make in the filming of court proceedings and participants, that 
these choices confer values, and that differently-produced footage elicits different 
responses from viewers. 
 
Research methods 
 
This article is based upon a mixed methods study of courtroom filming and trans-
mission in a UK context. This interdisciplinary study — undertaken by academic re-
searchers from the arts, social sciences, and humanities — had two key foci: the 
production of courtroom footage and audience reception. In the first stage of the 
project we undertook a comparative textual analysis of courtroom footage from 
England and Wales, Scotland, New Zealand, Canada, and a range of state courts 
in the USA. We were specifically interested in footage produced for contemporane-
ous transmission — whether via news coverage or an organisation’s website or 
YouTube channel — rather than footage produced for the purposes of documen-
tary-making. Beyond this, we left the parameters deliberately wide: we looked at 
footage from appeal and trial proceedings, produced by news organisations as well 
as dedicated court video-journalists. We wanted to get an insight into the range of 
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footage available to the public as ‘live’ court updates, whether as a clip incorporated 
into a news report, or as a video circulated on a Twitter feed, via a YouTube chan-
nel.  
 
We analysed roughly 50 hours of footage, paying close attention to how the space 
and proceedings of the courtroom were relayed and shaped through formal fea-
tures such as camera placement (including distance, angle and coverage), image 
composition (including lighting, colour, and the arrangement of people and objects 
within the frame), sound composition (including microphone coverage, sonic quality 
and sound mix), and the editing of different streams (in terms of selection and 
rhythm). To better understand the range of available choices, and the broader pro-
cess of production and distribution, we observed a pilot of courtroom filming in Bris-
tol Crown Court, and carried out a focus group with six UK news journalists and edi-
tors centrally involved in court-based reporting. These included journalists from the 
BBC, ITN, Sky News, a print journalist, and a documentary producer who had ex-
tensive experience of using courtroom footage. 
 
The second stage of the project involved using what we learned about the produc-
tion of courtroom footage to carry out a practice research exercise. This is a rela-
tively common research strategy in the arts, but rarely used in the social sciences. 
The aim of practice research is to use the creative process as the basis for a critical 
inquiry. It is a form of learning by doing, the assumption being that, as Barrett and 
Bolt (2010:2) put it ‘creative arts practice…[can be] a mode of knowledge produc-
tion’. The practice element for this study involved using publicly available footage 
from a US federal court to produce two substantially different versions of a short, 
three minute passage from a civil trial concerning a complaint of police brutality 
(see Version A: Olmo Artau v Farr A; and Version B: Olmo Artau v Farr B.). 
 
Producing the film versions yielded important insights in and of itself, most notably 
about the effects of including or omitting certain aspects of court proceedings. We 
also used the film versions in the final stage of the study, where we explored audi-
ence responses to courtroom footage. We asked a total of 40 participants to watch 
and answer questions about the footage we’d produced, with an even split of 20 
people watching each film version. We were specifically interested in how viewers 
interpreted the filmed exchange, and to that end participants were asked what they 
thought was happening in the footage, and their views about the lawyer and wit-
ness. We administered this survey online, via social media, and at the start of a set 
of four focus groups carried out for the study. The focus groups — with a total of 13 
participants — incorporated a range of courtroom footage and provided a more in-
depth understanding of how people watch and interpret video recordings of pro-
ceedings. All focus group participants were from the South-West of England. Two 
groups were recruited by advertising in local online fora, one was a group of Univer-
sity students, and one a group of retirees from the University of the Third Age. The 
focus group discussions were almost invariably lively and engaged: participants 
clearly enjoyed discussing their immediate impressions of different types of court-
room footage, their interpretations of events and courtroom participants, and, to-
wards the end of the session, their attitudes concerning courtroom transmission 
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more broadly. Before detailing the findings, we turn now to outline the historical and 
international context for courtroom broadcasting. 
 
Courtroom transmission in global perspective 
 
There is a relatively long history of documentary films focussed on specific court 
hearings. The 1948 documentary film of the Nuremberg International Military Tribu-
nal, Nuremberg: Its Lesson for Today (dir. Lorentz and Schulberg) is an early ex-
ample. Made in the USA, but broadcast in Germany, the documentary was meant 
as an exercise in accountability for the purpose of denazification — one, it bears 
noting, that was externally-imposed (Michalczyk 2014: 132-6). In-court filming for 
the purposes of news coverage was a later development. The USA was the front-
runner: State Court proceedings in California were first televised in 1978 (Ministry 
of Justice 2012: 14). As Stepniak (2004, 2012) observes, most liberal democracies 
started to allow contemporaneous (and, in some cases, as-live) courtroom trans-
mission much more recently, from the late 1980s onwards. 
 
The UK is a relatively late and (so far) partial adopter of courtroom filming and 
broadcasting. In Scotland, broadcasters have been able to apply for permission to 
film court proceedings since 1992, but extensive restrictions have meant take-up 
has been limited (Ministry of Justice, 2012: 13). There has been a more evident 
shift towards courtroom broadcasting in the UK’s upper appeal courts. The Consti-
tutional Reform Act 2005 marked the start of this shift by sanctioning the filming of 
summary judgements from the then-new UK Supreme Court. In 2013 the Court 
launched a dedicated YouTube channel, receiving an average 10,000 users each 
month (UKSC, 2015). In the same year, the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (Section 
32) sanctioned the filming and news broadcasting of barristers’ summing-up 
speeches and judges’ decisions from the UK Court of Appeal. Since then, the Court 
has had a dedicated video-journalist who produces an edited broadcast stream for 
distribution to the UK’s four major news organisations, the BBC, ITN, Sky, and the 
Press Association. In practice, it is footage from high profile appeals that is broad-
cast, such as, amongst others, the judge’s decision in the appeal brought by 
Mairead PhilPott — against her sentence for the manslaughter of her six children — 
which several of our research participants had watched.  
 
These relatively tentative developments in courtroom broadcasting foretell a more 
significant, wide-ranging shift. There has been considerable work during the last 
three years to assess official policies in this area, with a view to extending court-
room filming. This includes a review by the Scottish judiciary (Dorrian, 2015) and a 
pilot of filming sentencing decisions in criminal trials in England and Wales (Ministry 
of Justice, 2016). For those working in news organisations, a more wholesale shift 
towards the televisation of court proceedings is just a matter of time — or, as John 
Battle, head of compliance for ITN, a UK-based television company, put it in a re-
cent interview in The Guardian (2018), ‘it is inevitable there will be more filming in 
the courts in time to come’. 
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As noted above, these developments — current, and expected — reflect a global 
trend towards the transmission of court proceedings. This is not to ignore the differ-
ences that exist between jurisdictions in terms of how courtroom filming is man-
aged, the courts and aspects of proceedings that can be covered, and the arrange-
ments for distribution. For example, whilst many jurisdictions have been keen to in-
troduce cameras to their upper appeal courts — this is the case in the UK, Canada, 
and Brazil — in other cases courtroom filming is a means of transmitting the work of 
local or state, trial courts, notably the USA (Youm, 2012). In Norway, Scotland, and 
South Africa, specific cases have been televised during the last decade — those of 
Anders Breivik, Nat Fraser, and Oscar Pistorius respectively — but courtroom film-
ing remains something that is negotiated on a case-by-case basis in these jurisdic-
tions (Judicial Office for Scotland, 2013). By contrast, in the UK Supreme Court, 
filming is routine. 
 
Differences exist, and the challenges of filming trial and appeal proceedings are no 
doubt distinct, but still the more interesting observation is that jurisdictions around 
the world are embracing courtroom filming and transmission. In seeking to under-
stand this shift, Stepniak (2012) points to the development of new communications 
technology that reduces the intrusiveness of filming, the emergence of a legal rights 
discourse that takes heavy restrictions on courtroom reporting to be an encroach-
ment to freedom of information, and greater government interest in using the media 
to promote public confidence. These are certainly key factors, but for us this diag-
nosis raises questions about the role and operation of courtroom filming as a mech-
anism for increasing transparency and promoting public confidence. It is these 
ideas that we turn to next. 
 
Filming the courtroom in the era of transparency 
 
As noted above, the introduction and extension of courtroom transmission is part of 
a broader move towards institutional transparency, a key plank of public policy in 
twenty-first century liberal democracies (Moore, 2018). Within criminal justice policy 
there has been an evident growth in transparency initiatives over the past decade. 
In the UK, these include the launch of an online crime-mapping tool (Chainey and 
Tompson, 2012), the use of police body-worn cameras (Jameel and Bunn, 2015), 
and (our example) the introduction of courtroom filming (Ministry of Justice, 2012). 
The aim of each of these initiatives is to increase transparency and thereby boost 
public confidence and trust, though this relationship is surprisingly under-re-
searched. Where the public is considered at all in evaluations of courtroom filming 
initiativies, it is in terms of the sensationalisation of criminal trials involving celebrity 
defendants, most notably O.J. Simpson (see, for example, Kellner, 2003) — and 
even here audience response is largely presumed on the basis of media coverage. 
The alternative possibility — that the footage has served an educative function and 
boosted trust in justice processes and outcomes — is very rarely scrutinised. Biber 
(2018) makes a similar point in a recent article in this journal about the as-live 
transmission of the Oscar Pistorius trial, noting that it is unclear that this coverage 
eventuated in increased public trust in the administration of justice. Sousa et al’s 
(2015; 2018) research on police body-worn cameras in the USA — a rare project 
examining the relationship between transparency and public trust — suggests that 
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there is in fact an ambiguous relationship between seeing, understanding, and 
trusting justice agencies. In our study too, the relationship between ‘seeing’ and 
‘believing’ is far from clear-cut.  
 
We return to this point in the analysis below. For now, we want to note the connec-
tion between the official conception of transparency outlined above and the more 
long-standing principle of government openness (Moore, 2018). Johnston (2018) 
sees recent developments in court communication — including the televisation of 
proceedings and increased use of social media — in this way, pointing out that 
these twenty-first century transparency initiatives align with Jeremy Bentham’s 
eighteenth century vision of the open court (Bentham in Burton, 1843: 115-6). Both 
are premised on the idea that the public should have direct access to court hear-
ings, and that this has diffuse benefits, including improved public understanding of 
official processes and increased accountability for public institutions. Looked at 
from this perspective, developments in communication technology — specifically, 
the rise of the internet and new possibilities for circulating swathes of digital data — 
have given fresh impetus to open government projects.  
 
Transparency initiatives certainly capitalise on the features of digital data, record-
ing, and transmission to achieve similar aims to those associated with government 
openness. Nonetheless, we think it is useful to think about transparency as a dis-
tinctively twenty-first century project. This means recognising that ideas about pub-
lic access to the state and its auxillary agencies are not so much a natural conse-
quence of capacity — that is, the technical constraints on how much the state can 
show, and how much the public can see — as an expression of social and political 
arrangements — more specifically, normative ideas about what it means for the 
public to have access to official decisions and processes. 
 
These ideas change over time, and that is borne out when we think about the differ-
ences between Bentham’s vision of the open court and twenty-first century trans-
parency. Writing in the late eighteenth century, Bentham evocatively conjures up 
the open court as a place where judges feel the public’s gaze upon them, the public 
watch and learn, and witnesses’ testimony is scrutinised in ways they can’t control 
(Bentham in Burton, 1843: 115-6). Bentham’s open court is a social situation de-
fined by co-presence, shared space, and an often dynamic relationship between 
watching and being watched. Twenty-first century transparency initiativies — such 
as courtroom filming — envisages an altogether different form of openness. Here, 
public access is virtual and mediated. The public can ‘look in on’ a court hearing by 
watching filmed proceedings, but they are doing so at a distance, indirectly, and un-
seen by those participating in official processes. Compared to Bentham’s vision of 
the open court, it is a distinctly one-way form of access, where the public can see, 
but their presence is no longer felt. 
 
There are other ways in which transparency initiatives are reconfiguring the role — 
and potentially experience — of the watching public. Bentham’s open court is a 
place that afforded a certain depth of vision and promoted sustained, engaged 
watching (Bentham in Burton, 1843: 115-6). By contrast, the ‘transparent’ court 
available to us via online platforms is, on first sight, a vast repository of recordings. 
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In transparency initiatives more generally, what tends to be in the first instance ‘on 
show’ is an archive or database of official records — or else official records are cu-
rated in a way that emphasises breadth of vision. 
 
The UK’s online crime-mapping tool is an interesting example of the potential prob-
lems with this, as demonstrated in Chainey and Tompson's (2012) analysis of this 
transparency initiative. The tool allows users to produce a customised crime map 
for an area based on police records of the incidents and their progress. What is ‘on 
show’ in the first instance is a huge map of official responses to crime incidents, ap-
pearing as aggregate crime figures for geographical areas. Using the tool means 
zooming in on a select part of the map, which, click by click, provides a street-level 
view where records for specific incidents can then be accessed. The temptation — 
for these users, at least — is to continually move in and out, hopscotching over a 
region to see where and when the police have recorded incidents. It soon becomes 
clear, in using the tool, that this is what is being made accessible to the public: the 
records of police action and decision as and when those records were created. In 
other words, we have access to individual administrative records as individual ad-
ministrative records. We are afforded a certain breadth of vision, but the individual 
data-points that create this general view are very basic. Chainey and Tompson 
(2012) make this point too, and raise various concerns about the quality of data ac-
cessible via the online crime-mapping tool. Despite the interactivity of the crime 
map, and the seemingly direct access it provides to police records, it is, Chainey 
and Tompson (2012) argue, misleading in its depiction of crime and unconducive to 
public engagement.  
 
The problem, as Margetts (2014) points out, is that transparency initiatives tend to 
prioritise ‘pushing out’ large volumes of data over making that information intelligi-
ble to lay members of the public. The conclusion returns to this issue, by consider-
ing what courtroom filming tells us about the ‘transparent courtoom’, and the project 
of transparency more broadly. The next section works towards identifying the domi-
nant stylistic mode of transparency, though an in-depth examination of the produc-
tion choices involved in transmitting the courtroom. 
 
Courtroom filming as mediated justice 
 
In their first major study of news production, the Glasgow University Media Group 
(2009 [1976]: 1) pointed out that ‘[c]ontrary to the claims, conventions and culture of 
television journalism, the news is not a neutral product….[but rather] a highly medi-
ated product’. A similar observation can be made about courtroom footage pro-
duced for the purposes of contemporaneous reporting. In an article providing a fo-
cussed analysis of footage from the UK Supreme Court, Moran (2016) identifies 
several factors that shape production of this material. These include legal re-
strictions and Court guidelines concerning which aspects of proceedings can be 
filmed. In the UK Court of Appeal, for example, the video-journalist tasked with pro-
ducing footage for distribution to news organisations is only permitted to film barris-
ters’ summing up speeches and judges’ sentencing remarks (Ministry of Justice, 
2012). In some State criminal trial courts in the USA, witnesses are routinely filmed 
(Judicial Office for Scotland, 2013). In New Zealand, rules on what can be filmed in 
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criminal trials are more detailed: extreme close-ups are prohibited, and filming of 
defendants is subject to a set of specific restrictions (Courts of New Zealand, 2016: 
Schedule 1). As Moran (2016) points out, different risks pertain to the transmission 
of appeal, as opposed to trial proceedings, and rules concerning filming to some 
degree reflect these perceived risks.  
 
Official rules concerning ‘what can be shown’ serve as an important parameter for 
courtroom filming, but they are by no means the only factor that influence the pro-
duction of footage. Also important is the decision to film (and then, as a separate 
decision, to transmit) particular proceedings, and the installation of recording de-
vices. The former determines which hearings the public are given access to; the lat-
ter helps determine which parts of a hearing we get to see and hear. Here, in the 
choice of camera lens, angle and distance, as well as microphone placement and 
coverage, there is considerable scope to prioritise certain types of sound (the 
speaking voice, background noise, exchanges between people) and certain types 
of visual arrangements (the speaking person, background participants, the para-
phernalia of the courtroom, amongst other things). Moran (2016) writes at some 
length on these technological and infrastructural elements, emphasising the im-
portance of camera position (in the UK Supreme Court, and most other courts be-
sides, these are wall-mounted and raised above head-height) and microphone posi-
tion. He points out that these features make some aspects of the courtroom vari-
ously more and less visible, as well as more and less audible than would be the 
case for a member of the public sitting in the gallery. Parker’s (2015) work on the 
soundscapes of international criminal trials similarly points to the role of audio tech-
nology in shaping participation in justice processes — by, for example, court partici-
pants listening separately to interpreted testimony via headphones. 
 
To return to our broader point: all of the elements outlined above — the legislative 
restrictions on who and what to film, the decision to film a particular hearing, the 
setting up of the courtroom for filming — are important in producing particular types 
of courtroom footage, and this is before we even get to the point at which a camera 
is turned on. At this stage, there is a further set of decisions to be made about, 
amongst other things, the pace of editing and the selection of shots. And if the foot-
age is taken up by news organisations it is subject to another round of mediation. At 
this point, it will be positioned within a wider news report, and might be re-edited, 
cropped, overlaid with voice-over, and altered in terms of sound mix and colour. 
 
Courtroom footage is, then, to return to the Glasgow University Media Group’s 
phrase, a ‘highly-mediated product’. This means acknowledging that its production 
involves a set of choices and, crucially, that there are reasons for the resulting dif-
ferences in footage. These reasons extend beyond official rules and physical con-
straints. Moran (2016) makes a similar point when he suggests that there are ‘un-
written rules’ about the purpose of courtroom transmission that impact upon pro-
duction choices. Chief amongst these ‘unwritten rules’ is the idea that courtroom 
footage is a matter of ‘just filming’, rather than ‘making a piece of television’, a dis-
tinction made by the UK Supreme Court’s Head of Communications (Moran, 2016: 
251). It is, as Moran (2016) points out, a false dichotomy: the ‘just filming’ model of 
courtroom transmission involves a set of choices and intended effects. Drawing 
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upon a close analysis of two films of UK Supreme Court summary judgements, he 
notes that one of the films is dominated by a six minute close-up of the speaking 
judge, and argues that this works to confirm the notion that the camera is ‘just film-
ing’, serving merely as a ‘machine that merely grasps the object before the lens and 
records its presence’ (Moran, 2016: 252). The overall effect is a form of visibility 
‘that displays minimal signs of its own production’ (Moran, 2016: 253). The other 
film analysed by Moran (2016) is, he suggests, more televisual in its use of editing 
and shot selection. His broader point is that courtroom broadcasting produces par-
ticular forms of visibility. 
 
Our formal audiovisual analysis of courtroom footage identified two globally domi-
nant stylistic modes, and they broadly coincide with those noted by Moran (2016).  
In our wide-ranging analysis of footage from a range of courts and jurisdictions, we 
found a tendency for footage to rely upon sustained medium close-ups of speaking 
parties. For instance, in the UK Court of Appeal, both the judge’s summing-up and 
barristers’ closing speeches are shown in sustained one-shots (Fig. 1), effectively 
as talking heads, without wider coverage of the scene. There is little attempt made 
to locate that person in the space of the courtroom or with regard to the wider activ-
ity of the court. The image stream is formed by cutting between usually just two or 
three feeds, each the product of a fixed camera. There is rarely any attempt to as-
sist viewer orientation, by, for instance, returning to establishing shots or including 
objects-in-common between cuts. The editing tends to switch to another medium 
close-up only when another participant starts talking, following the logic of a visual 
transcript. We therefore call this the transcription mode of courtroom filming, and 
we associate this particular stylistic mode with the norms and values of transpar-
ency (we will return to this idea in the conclusion). Both the UK Court of Appeal and 
UK Supreme Court adhere to this approach, as does the filming of appeals and tri-
als in New Zealand, proceedings in the Supreme Court of Canada, and hearings in 
most US State courts. 
 
Figure 1:Footage from the UK Court of Appeal             Figure 2: Footage from Oslo District Court, 
                                 
trial of Anders Breivik  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A rarer stylistic mode of courtroom filming for contemporaneous transmission in-
volves more cameras placed at more varied lengths from the primary attention 
points in the courtroom. For instance, in the trial of Anders Breivik in Oslo’s District 
Court, when evidence is being presented to the court, we are offered a succession 
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of views of the courtroom. At one point, a medium close-up of the prosecutor is fol-
lowed by a tighter close-up of Breivik. We see him smile, his gaze turned down-
wards, at which point we cut to a wider mid-shot. In this wider shot (Fig. 2) we can 
see that Breivik is writing, which makes sense of his down-turned gaze, and we are 
offered a view that locates him in the courtroom, surrounded by legal practitioners 
and security officers. There are frequent returns to establishing shots to help orien-
tate the viewer. There may be the opportunity to cut between close and wider shots 
of the same participant, locating them within the space of the court. Cameras may 
be mobile (able to zoom and pan) and therefore able to respond if, for instance, an 
attorney paces around or moves away from a pedestal. Editing is responsive to ex-
changes between participants and to the logic of the unfolding situation. We are 
likely to see people listening, perhaps also making or checking notes, as well as 
seeing people speaking. Above all, this stylistic mode is the consequence of an in-
terest in following what happens in the courtroom: we therefore call it the observa-
tional mode of courtroom filming.  
 
It may be tempting to see these modes as arising naturally from different circum-
stances, such as tight government budgets or the involvement of the independent 
media (e.g. the Breivik trial, for which TV news cameras were permitted into the 
courtroom). However, that would be to neglect the degree to which these stylistic 
modes coincide with different ideas about what the courtroom is and what it means 
to ‘see justice being done’. It is important to recognise that what we are calling the 
transcription mode is part of the rhetoric of transparency. It is not the absence of 
style, but a very particular style, one designed to summon a technocratic impres-
sion of the justice system. We return to this point in the Conclusion. For now, we 
want to point out that the virtue of thinking about courtroom filming in terms of dis-
tinctive stylistic modes is that we can consider what difference it makes to capture 
courtroom proceedings in one way or another. Though not his substantive point of 
interest, Moran (2016) speculates about the different, and potentially unforeseen, 
effects of courtroom filming-styles on audience response. Is it possible, he asks, 
that seeing ‘more’ result in trusting less? What are the effects of giving viewers ‘an 
extended opportunity…to contemplate’ the judge? (Moran, 2016: 254). Does a 
more ‘televisual’ style of courtroom footage ‘facilitate the flow of information to an 
audience or impede it?’ (Moran 2016: 254). This study seeks to answer these im-
portant questions by considering the different effects of courtroom footage. We do 
this, first through a detailed discussion of the practice research exercise carried out 
for this study, and secondly through an examination of how audience members 
make sense of courtroom footage.  
 
Making sense of courtroom footage through practice research 
 
As mentioned above, the practice research exercise carried out for this study in-
volved producing two different film versions of court proceedings. Crucially, we 
were able to access two separate and distinct video feeds of a cross-examination: 
Feed 1 from a fixed camera trained on the witness stand where a claimant was be-
ing interrogated, Feed 2 from a fixed camera trained on the lawyers’ bench from 
where a legal advocate was issuing questions. This allowed us to experiment by 
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cutting back and forth between the two feeds at different points in the cross-exami-
nation, with the audio remaining constant. 
 
Even with a single variable at our disposal, the hands-on practice of making these 
different versions called attention to the sheer malleability of courtroom actuality. 
For example, in the course of a back-and-forth exchange with the defence attorney, 
the claimant repeats an allegation that police officers manhandled him when they 
‘threw’ him into a waiting police car. The transcript (2.04 to 2.12 in the video) runs 
as follows: 
 
Claimant: They was both in there and they threw me in the car. 
 
Attorney: [pause] Threw you in the car? 
 
Claimant: Well, throw me inside the car. 
 
Attorney: Picked you up off the ground and threw you in? 
 
Claimant: Well, just grab you, how they throw you inside the car. 
 
One advantage of courtroom filming over audio transcription is, of course, that ges-
tures and intonation become part of the public record. And indeed, if we show Feed 
1 for the duration of this exchange, we will see that the claimant underlines his 
speech with a couple of physical gestures, swinging both arms across his body in 
an action that might recall the tossing of garbage. If, however, during this exchange 
the image track consists of Feed 2, remaining fixed on the attorney, the claimant’s 
gestures will go unseen. Every act of selection is also an act of omission. It seems 
likely that seeing the gesture will yield a more vivid impression of the claim. Hearing 
the claim without its accompanying physical illustration, by contrast, may make it 
seem like the claimant is merely repeating himself, unable to substantiate his re-
port. Instead we will have a view of the defence attorney, whose sceptical, un-
moved expression on receiving this report may prompt our interpretation further in 
this direction. At any rate, the point here is that the choice of feed at this moment – 
hence, potentially at any moment – has the potential to dramatically shape how we 
interpret courtroom proceedings. 
 
It does not follow from this, however, that the camera should forever remain on the 
speaking party in case he or she offers an accompanying gesture. For example, a 
few moments earlier, the clip records the following exchange: 
 
Attorney: If I understood your testimony on direct [i.e. under direct examina-
tion], you say they say dragged you to the car? 
 
Claimant: Well, they didn’t practically drag me, they just banged me every-
where, it’s rails going outside, they’re banging me everywhere and... being 
kinda, ur, rough, if you wanna call it, with me, all the way out there. I can’t – 
my back hurts too much, I can’t – it was hard to walk. And I keep asking them 
for an ambulance and they keep denying it to me. So they was just dragging 
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me – not dragging me like dragging me, but they was being rough, aggres-
sive – towards the car.  
 
[Pause]  
 
I mean, dragging me, like dragging me, I’d be laying down on the ground, 
that’s what I understand for ‘dragging’. No. 
 
Attorney: So it’s not that. 
 
Claimant: No, it was not that – I was still able to walk, they was just being 
rough. 
 
The claimant’s pause halfway through this passage of testimony is about four or 
five seconds in length, and may seem surprising, possibly odd or even suspicious, 
for a viewer who only has access to Feed 1. That viewer would be justified in won-
dering if this pause and resumption represents a further adjustment in the claim-
ant’s story. Those shown Feed 2, on the other hand, will be able to grasp that the 
attorney gives a gesture with both hands that suggests that he is trying to picture 
the situation. The gesture is therefore effectively an additional question, a request 
for further information, to which the claimant responds by trying to define ‘dragging’ 
in an attempt to clarify his characterisation of the event. What this example shows, 
in other words, is not just that matters of selection are likely to shape the inferences 
an audience will draw (although that is doubtless true), but, more importantly, that 
there are ways of reconstructing the material that can make more sense of court-
room proceedings. In particular, we found that restricting the extent and responsive-
ness of cutting between participants is likely to obscure the nature of interaction in 
the courtroom. 
 
Having experimented with different ways of assembling the two feeds, we wanted 
to explore next how audiences would respond to some of these different versions. 
We constructed two versions to broadly correspond to each of the stylistic modes 
we outlined in the section above, the first conforming to the transcription mode, and 
the second the observational mode. Our two versions can be viewed here: Version 
A: Olmo Artau v Farr A; Version B: Olmo Artau v Farr B. Version A more regularly 
shows the attorney as he asks questions, responds to claims, consults papers, and 
so on — all, it’s worth reiterating, captured by a fixed camera trained on the attor-
ney, who remains behind the podium for the duration of the filming. Version B is 
closer to the transcription mode, offering more sustained shots of the claimant with 
the attorney’s questions regularly heard from offscreen. We showed these versions 
to survey respondents and asked them for their views on the exchange. One of the 
two versions was also shown to focus groups alongside material from a range of 
other jurisdictions.  
 
Audience interpretations of courtroom footage 
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A recurring theme in the focus groups, irrespective of the type of footage watched, 
was concern over selectivity. Participants frequently expressed frustration at not be-
ing able to see more, and in discussing their restricted vantage point in watching 
proceedings, commonly questioned why the footage directed their attention to par-
ticular courtroom participants and not others. The frustration was especially acute in 
the group composed of members of the University of the Third Age. Asked if they 
had watched any as-live court broadcasts, one woman spoke of her general sense 
of frustration with this coverage, and it was directed towards journalists and editors. 
‘Who are these people to handpick what we see or hear?’, she exclaimed at one 
point. She was referring to the coverage of the Oscar Pistorius trial in the first in-
stance, but was similarly critical of footage from the UK Supreme Court (which, she 
complained, didn’t give ‘a sense of the actual procedure’). For her, selection was an 
intrinsic problem that didn’t go away with the ‘transcription’ stylistic mode of court-
room filming.  
 
Each of the groups had an extended and mixed discussion concerning participants’ 
preferences for particular types of footage. We left this as an open question, and it 
was one that generally sparked lively and productive debates about the function of 
court transmissions. There was widespread agreement that footage that was con-
structed to approximate courtroom drama risked sensationalising proceedings, alt-
hough this was a presumed, third person effect. That is, none of the participants en-
gaged with the footage in this way, but worried that others might. In turn, the foot-
age that, in our analysis, conforms to the transcription stylistic mode was generally 
seen as 'amazingly dull', as one participant succinctly put it. Some felt that this was 
entirely in keeping with the tone and function of court processes; others — and they 
were greater in number — saw the seeming absence of an attempt to engage view-
ers as emblematic of a particular attitude, a point we return to below. 
 
Participants’ responses to the differently-edited versions of the US federal trial illu-
minated a set of more nuanced differences in audience response. Those who 
watched Version A, which shows more of the attorney, even at points when the 
claimant is speaking, tended to demonstrate a more detailed comprehension of the 
episode. In their answers to the question ‘What do you think is going on in this 
clip?’, for example, they were much more likely than participants who had watched 
Version B to point out specific features of the exchange, such as the involvement of 
two police officers, the place of arrest, and the lawyer’s interrogation of the wording 
of the claimant’s written statement. In total, ten of the 20 participants who watched 
Version A picked up on such details. Moreover, perhaps surprisingly, given that the 
audio was identical in each version, six of the participants shown Version A offered 
an account using words that were spoken during the clip — for instance, the word 
‘rough’, as uttered by the claimant — with three of them making clear that they were 
directly quoting the footage. By contrast, none of the participants who watched Ver-
sion B showed this level of recall, with only two referring to specific elements of the 
exchange they watched. Their responses tended to be less in-depth, with six of the 
20 participants who watched this film version giving very basic descriptions of what 
they watched, such as ‘lawyer questioning the victim’. 
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It wasn’t just that those who watched Version B tended to notice less, but that their 
engagement seemed to be of a different nature than those who watched Version A. 
Those who watched Version B mainly described the lawyer in vague terms, as, 
generally ‘doing his job’, as one respondent put it. It is reasonable to suggest here 
that since the lawyer got less screen time in Version B this resulted in him being an 
altogether less vivid character for those who watched this footage. Indeed, one par-
ticipant commented directly on this, pointing out that the ‘camera was on him a lot 
less, so [I have] no strong feelings towards him’. By contrast, the claimant loomed 
large for those who watched Version B, and they tended to attach considerable im-
portance to the question of his trustworthiness — almost as if they saw themselves 
as jury by proxy. Eight of the 20 participants focussed on this issue when respond-
ing to the question ‘What do you think of the person giving evidence?’, and three of 
these were especially detailed accounts. Take the following response, with italics 
used to show up the degree to which veracity and trustworthiness are key features 
of this participant’s response to the claimant in Version B: 
 
 He seems relatively relaxed and confident. Struggles a bit to clarify what  
 happened, but is clever and seems thorough and honest in the way he at 
 tempts to translate his recollection of what happened. Still, it feels slightly  
 suspicious as to what might have actually happened. I think he might know 
 how to play the victim. However, to a certain extent I sympathize with him. I 
 think of him as being more honest than the lawyer. 
 
By contrast, those who watched Version A were less likely to take on this adjudica-
tive role, rarely engaging in any consideration of whether the claimant was lying. 
Only two of the 20 participants engaged in this type of speculation, and both of 
these were brief mentions of honesty and consistency respectively. Instead, they 
were more likely to defer this judgement, focussing on whether the lawyer believed 
the claimant to be lying or telling the truth. ‘He is not very convinced by what the 
man is saying’ commented one participant, and, in total, six of those who watched 
Version A — and none who watched Version B — offered views about how the law-
yer was signalling his attitude to the claimant and how he was approaching his task. 
It seems likely this was the result of being able to see how the lawyer was consult-
ing papers, listening to remarks and more visibly putting the claimant under pres-
sure. In other words, they seemed to position themselves as watching an exchange 
unfold, rather than rather than as adjudicators.  
 
These conclusions are, of course, based on a small sample. They were, though, 
consistently supported elsewhere in the study, specifically in the way in which focus 
group participants responded to other courtroom footage. With great regularity, we 
found that long duration mid-shots of courtroom participants (sustained, in some 
cases, for several minutes or more) tended to prompt focus group members to re-
flect at some length on the veracity and/or authority of the person speaking. This 
was particularly evident in people’s responses to footage of a criminal trial from a 
US State court where a static camera, fixed upon the witness box, had been used 
to record court proceedings in a single take. As one focus group participant com-
mented, the space is only vaguely recognisable as a courtroom (as he pointed out, 
it could just as well be footage of a political speech). In turn, the focus is entirely on 
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the witness giving testimony, who in this instance happens to be a police officer. 
For one focus group participant, a male retiree, the witness ‘ooz[ed] unreliability’. 
Participants in other focus groups felt similarly, with one young woman inadvert-
ently talking about this witness as being 'on trial'.  
 
Importantly, sustained coverage of other courtroom participants elicited similarly fo-
rensic analyses of character and reliability. In other words, this effect was not only 
in evidence when viewers were watching someone speaking from the witness box. 
In watching footage from the UK’s Court of Appeal of judges’ summing-up 
speeches, focus group participants frequently offered judgement on the judges 
themselves. Extracted from a wider context by virtue of the single-frame, fixed cam-
era arrangement, the images of judges seemed to invite scrutiny, less about what 
they were saying and more about his or her manner and bearing. Some saw the 
judges in positive terms, as 'clear', 'concise', 'intellectual', and 'dispassionate'. More 
frequently, comments were negative. Participants took particular exception to 
judges’ tone of voice, described variously as 'punchy', 'harsh', 'unemotional', 
'brusque', 'intimidating', 'blunt', and having 'no empathy'. For many, there was a per-
ceived incongruity 'between the way they’re talking and what they’re talking about', 
as one of the male participants put it. This was a point of discussion in all four of the 
focus groups, and for some the irritation went beyond a nagging concern with the 
judge’s mode of delivery to a disdain for intellectual posturing. Female participants 
were especially vocal on this point. One, a speech therapist in her late 20s, was 'a 
bit distracted by the wig'. Another, a female retiree in her early 60s, described the 
UK court footage, and the judge’s role in particular, as a 'kind of intellectual 
thing…a bit of a game' adding, later, that her main impression of the UK Supreme 
Court was the 'ponderous solemnity of the whole thing. [Adopts posh voice] ‘We are 
very important people’…' Other female participants were specifically put off by the 
lack of diversity in the courtroom; one young woman’s first reaction to what she had 
seen was: 'very, very white male'. In one sense, in noticing these things, focus 
group participants are simply picking up on the homogeneity of the UK judiciary. 
We would add, however, that the transcription mode encourages viewers to fasten 
onto the personal characteristics of the speaking subject. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Throughout this article we have argued that there are choices to be made when 
filming the courtroom, both on the local level of production and in terms of broader 
stylistic modes. The analysis presented above has sought to give a thorough ac-
count of why these observations matter. The practice research exercise and the 
connected audience study showed that even an adjustment in the bare sequencing 
of shots (i.e. 'what gets shown when') can help or hinder an audience’s ability to 
make sense of what happens in the courtroom, and invite them to engage in a par-
ticular way with the material. Our study found that lengthy shots of a speaking sub-
ject tend to encourage viewers to query the truth-claims and authority of that per-
son, whether defendant, witness, or judge. By contrast, when cuts between court-
room participants are more frequent and the wider court is shown, viewers tend to 
understand themselves as observing a justice process and are more likely to en-
gage with how that process is unfolding. Questions about veracity – for instance, 
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the veracity of the claimant alleging police manhandling – do not disappear, but 
viewers are less likely to take it upon themselves to adjudicate, perhaps because 
they see more vividly that those claims are being put under pressure and scruti-
nised by courtroom participants. 
 
Likewise, our study indicated that the way a judge is visually extracted from the 
wider court, by means of a sustained and uninterrupted medium shot for the dura-
tion of a summing-up speech, is likely to encourage a perception of that judge as 
unaccountable and out-of-touch. Moreover, such a perception was likely to be seen 
as emblematic of problems of the criminal justice system more broadly. In this, and 
other ways besides, the dominant approach to courtroom filming achieves precisely 
the opposite of what governments anticipated. Above, we pointed out that the most 
common rationale for courtroom broadcasting is to improve public understanding of 
and trust in criminal justice processes and outcomes. Our analysis suggests that 
the transcription mode of courtroom filming (characterised by extended-duration, 
talking-head shots of judges, barristers, or witnesses, cut off from the wider context 
of the courtroom and speaking merely in the direction of unseen others) is more 
likely to prompt feelings of distrust in justice systems than the observational mode. 
 
The transcription mode is likewise an own-goal for public understanding of the jus-
tice system. In our study, viewers who watched footage that showed the attorney’s 
responses to the claimant and stressed the interaction between the two parties 
were significantly more likely to recall details of what was said, despite the audio 
being the same in both versions. This suggests that a common-sense prescription 
for how a court’s video journalist should proceed – namely, ‘show whomsoever is 
speaking at any given point’ – will not necessarily yield the most informative and 
engaging view of the courtroom. We have pointed, for instance, to the utility of 
shots that help locate the participants within a wider concrete space, and of editing 
that allows an audience to follow the sense of an unfolding exchange. 
 
More generally, this article has sought to interrogate the relationship between see-
ing, believing, and trusting. By way of conclusion, we want to suggest this as a fruit-
ful line of inquiry for other researchers interested in crime and the media. Far from 
being relevant only to the specific innovation of courtroom broadcasting, the analy-
sis presented above — interested as it is in how footage might prompt viewers to 
adopt an adjudicatory role, and the effects of this — is pertinent to our understand-
ing of, amongst other things, the consequences of moving towards mediated court 
appearances and viewers’ engagement with criminal justice investigation documen-
taries (such as Making a Murderer, 2015, dir. Ricciardi and Demos). 
 
We have sought to show, too, that the study of courtroom broadcasting contributes 
to our understanding of institutional transparency. Our analysis suggests that the 
idea that transparency initiatives open a neutral window onto criminal justice pro-
cesses and practices is fundamentally unsound. Instead, we have argued, the tran-
scription mode of courtroom filming should be seen as a stylistic option that 
amounts to a claim about the criminal justice system and how justice should be 
‘seen to be done’. The transcription mode declares the courtroom to be nothing 
more than a bureaucratic site from which information is given, statements are 
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made, judgements are announced. The continuous depositing of this material into 
the archive thereby amounts to a specific form of the data-dumping that character-
ises transparency more generally. At one level, the archive of footage represents a 
digital swamp that no lay viewer is likely to trawl through; even at the level of an in-
dividual case, the mere fact of ‘accessibility’ is, as the analysis above demon-
strates, prioritised over intelligibility.  
 
Again, Bentham’s vision of the ‘open court’ provides a useful point of comparison. 
Bentham believed that open courts served as schools and theatres for democratic 
societies (Bentham in Burton, 1843: 115-6). He saw them as places of dynamic co-
presence and engaged spectatorship. Our suggestion is that ‘transparent’ courts — 
transparency initiatives more generally — work towards an altogether different form 
of public participation. The ‘transparent court’ is more informational than educative, 
and more technocratic than performative. The stylistic mode associated with trans-
parency might, perhaps, be best thought of as an anti-style, but it is by no means 
neutral in its effects on viewers. We would add, by way of a final thought, that just 
as Bentham’s ‘open court’ reflects a particular vision of the public’s role in demo-
cratic processes, new attempts to mediate criminal justice suggest an altogether 
different vision of the public’s role in seeing justice being done — that is, as pas-
sive, anonymous, and distant viewers of bureaucratic outcomes. 
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